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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a car accident involving two vehicles that is caused solely due
to the negligence of one driver, whereby the other driver is injured.' An
ambulance quickly arrives at the accident scene and rushes the injured driver
to a nearby hospital, where he receives extensive medical treatment.2 After
he is discharged from the hospital, he is handed a bill totaling $80,000 of
medical expenses.' Fortunately, the injured driver's medical expenses are
covered by his employer-sponsored health plan,4 governed by the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).5 However, as a result of the acci-
dent he also suffers an estimated $500,000 in non-economic damages, as-
suming a price can be placed on his pain and suffering.6 The injured driver
hires an attorney and sues the party responsible for the accident.7 After
months of negotiations, the injured driver finally recovers a settlement in the
amount of $100,000.8 Although this will only compensate him for a fraction
of his actual damages, he feels fortunate to recover anything at all.9 After
$20,000 in attorney's fees, his net recovery is $80,000.10
The next day, he receives a letter from his ERISA insurer, demanding
reimbursement of the $80,000 in medical expenses that the insurer paid on
his behalf.1' Confused and bewildered, the employee pulls out a copy of his
health plan, and finds, amidst the hundreds of pages, a subrogation clause. 12
The clause reads something like this:
This subrogation provision applies when you are sick or injured as
a result of the act or omission of another person or party. Subroga-
tion means the [c]ompany's right to recover any payments made to
you or your dependent by a third party... because of an injury or
illness caused by a third party. Third party means another person
or organization.
1. This hypothetical is based loosely on a federal court case. See Mid Atl. Med. Servs.,
Inc. v. Sereboff (Sereboffl), 303 F. Supp. 2d 691, 693 (D. Md. 2004).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000).
6. See SereboffI, 303 F. Supp. 2d at 693.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See Sereboffl, 303 F. Supp. 2d at 693.
12. See id. at 697-98.
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If you or your dependent receives benefits and have a right to re-
cover damages from a third party, the [c]ompany is subrogated to
this right. All recoveries from a third party (whether by lawsuit,
settlement, or otherwise) must be used to reimburse the [c]ompany
... for benefits paid. Any remainder will be yours or your de-
pendents. The [c]ompany's share of the recovery will not be re-
duced because you or your dependent has not received the full
damages claimed, unless the [clompany agrees in writing to a re-
duction. '
3
The injured driver finds this provision unjust.'4 He believes that be-
cause the insurer has been collecting the premium payments, the insurer
should not be reimbursed until after he has been fully compensated for his
injuries. 5 The insurer, on the other hand, maintains that the enforcement of
the provision is just because the injured driver agreed to these terms by sign-
ing the insurance policy.' 6 As such, the injured driver refuses to reimburse
the insurer and the insurer files a lawsuit against him 7 to enforce the provi-
sion under ERISA section 502(a)(3). 8 Depending on how the settlement
proceeds are allocated, the creativity of the injured employee's attorney, and
how the insurer's attorney states a claim, a court may or may not require the
injured employee to fully reimburse the insurer. 9
This Note discusses the issue of subrogation and reimbursement actions,
brought by ERISA insurers, as they relate to situations such as the one pre-
sented in the hypothetical above. Part II presents a brief summary of ERISA
and when it applies. This part also provides an overview of what reim-
bursement and subrogation actions are and when they arise under ERISA.
Part III details federal circuit interpretations of the law established by the
United States Supreme Court in the landmark case, Great- West Life & Annu-
13. Id. (emphasis added).
14. See id. at 693.
15. See id.
16. See SereboffI, 303 F. Supp. 2d at 696.
17. Id. at 693.
18. ERISA: THE LAW AND THE CODE § 2-99 (Michael G. Kushner & Karen Hsu eds.,
1999); 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2000). See, e.g,. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41,
52 (1987) (referring to the civil enforcement provision as "ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. §
1132(a)").
19. See, e.g., Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 214 (2002)
(refusing to reimburse the insurer for medical expenses paid because the settlement proceeds
were allocated to a trust that was not in the beneficiary's possession and the insurer's attorney
sought a legal remedy); but see Sereboff v. Mid Atil. Med. Servs., Inc. (SereboffII1), No. 05-
260, slip op. at 5 (U.S. May 15, 2006) (requiring reimbursement for medical expenses because
the settlement proceeds were placed in an account that was in the beneficiary's possession and
the insurer's attorney sought an equitable remedy).
3
Sheres: Setting the Stage for Creative Lawyering in ERISA Reimbursement A
Published by NSUWorks, 2006
NOVA LA WREVIEW
ity Insurance Co. v. Knudson.2 ° Part IV discusses Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic
Medical Services, Inc. (Sereboff II), 2 l the most recent United States Su-
preme Court decision on the issue of ERISA reimbursement, and compares
the facts and holding of this case to those of Knudson. Part IV also explains
how SereboffIII clarified the conflict among the circuits regarding this issue,
which was created by the Knudson decision. Part V focuses on the likely
effect that the SereboffII ruling will have on future reimbursement and sub-
rogation actions brought by ERISA insurers. Finally, Part VI suggests solu-
tions to the problems that will likely result from the SereboffIII decision.
II. ERISA AND REIMBURSEMENT
In order to fully understand the issues analyzed in this note, a basic un-
derstanding of ERISA, subrogation, and reimbursement is necessary. Sec-
tion A of this part provides an overview of ERISA, why this statute was en-
acted, and a description of the ERISA provisions that are applicable to insur-
ers' reimbursement and subrogation actions. Section B defines and differen-
tiates subrogation and reimbursement and explains when they apply in
ERISA actions.
A. ERISA Generally
ERISA22 is a series of federal statutes that was enacted in 197423 in re-
sponse to the mismanagement and failure of many employer-sponsored pen-
sion funds.24 This failure resulted in employees receiving only a small per-
centage of their promised benefits or none at all.2 5 Congress' primary pur-
poses for enacting ERISA were to regulate these pension funds and protect
employees. 26 However, the courts expanded the scope of ERISA's coverage
20. 534 U.S. 204 (2002).
21. No. 05-260, slip op. at 5.
22. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000).
23. § 146 1(a). "The provisions of this subchapter take effect on September 2, 1974." Id.
24. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 264 (1993) (White, J., dissenting).
25. See, e.g., James A. Wooten, "The Most Glorious Story of Failure in the Business
The Studebaker-Packard Corporation and the Origins of ERISA, 49 BUFF. L. REv. 683, 684
(2001). "Some received a lump-sum payment worth a fraction of the pension they expected,
and others got nothing at all." Id.; see also ERISA: THE LAW AND THE CODE, supra note 18, §
2.
26. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 939, 939-40 (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.). "It is hereby further
declared to be the policy of this Act to protect ... the interests of participants in private pen-
sion plans .... " Id. at 940; see also H.R. Rep. No. 93-533, pt. I, at 1 (1973), as reprinted in
[Vol. 31
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beyond pension fund regulation to all employer sponsored benefit plans.27
Since ERISA's enactment, courts have concluded that Congress' goals in-
clude developing a uniform federal common law, 2 ensuring the solvency of
employee benefit plans,29 and encouraging employers to provide fringe bene-
fits to their employees.3" The two sections of ERISA that embody these pur-
poses and goals are sections 51431 and 502.32 Section 514 outlines ERISA's
preemptive effect on state laws, 33 and section 502 outlines ERISA's exclu-
sive remedial scheme.34
Section 514, sometimes called the "preemption clause,' 35 provides that
ERISA "shall supersede any and all [s]tate laws insofar as they may now or
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan., 36 ERISA describes an "em-
ployee benefit plan" as any plan "established or maintained (1) by any em-
ployer engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting com-
merce; or (2) by any employee organization or organizations representing
employees engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting
commerce; or (3) by both., 3 7 The statutory text of ERISA does not indicate
how close of a relationship is required to satisfy the "relate to" language for
ERISA preemption; however, the United States Supreme Court has defined
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4639. "The primary purpose of the bill is the protection of individ-
ual pension rights .. " Id.
27. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (2000). This Act "shall apply to any employee benefit plan." Id.
28. See N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
514 U.S. 645, 657 (1995). See also Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 11 (1987).
It is thus clear that ERISA's pre-emption provision was prompted by recognition that employ-
ers establishing and maintaining employee benefit plans are faced with the task of coordinating
complex administrative activities. A patchwork scheme of regulation would introduce consid-
erable inefficiencies in benefit program operation, which might lead those employers with ex-
isting plans to reduce benefits, and those without such plans to refrain from adopting them.
Pre-emption ensures that the administrative practices of a benefit plan will be governed by
only a single set of regulations.
Id.
29. See ERISA: THE LAW AND THE CODE, supra note 18, § 2-3.
30. See H.R. Rep. No. 93-533, pt. I, at 4639-40. The bill was designed to promote the
expansion of these plans and increase the number of employees receiving them. Id. at 4640.
31. ERISA: THE LAW AND THE CODE, supra note 18, § 2-107. Section 514 of ERISA is
also printed in the United States Code under § 1144, and the two provisions are used inter-
changeably. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2000); ERISA: THE LAW AND THE CODE, supra note 18. §
2-107.
32. ERISA: THE LAW AND THE CODE, supra note 18, § 2-99.
33. Id. § 2-107.
34. Id. § 2-99.
35. Humana Inc. v. Forsyth, 525 U.S. 299, 310 (1999).
36. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (emphasis added); ERISA: THE LAW AND THE CODE, supra note
18, §2-107 (emphasis added).
37. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (2000).
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the phrase "relate to" as having a "broad common sense meaning., 38  In
1995, the Court clarified that although Congress intended this provision to be
applied broadly, it did not intend for it to preempt state laws that have only
an indirect economic effect on the subject matter of an ERISA plan.3 9 A
clause in section 514 limits the scope of ERISA from being read too broadly,
by carving out an exception for state laws that regulate insurance.4 ° It also
clarifies that self-insured employee benefit plans do not constitute insurance
companies that are exempt from ERISA. " In other words, an employer that
acts like an insurance company by providing a set of benefits to its employ-
ees, such as promising to pay medical expenses, is governed by ERISA.42
These types of benefit plans fit easily into the category which ERISA defines
as an "employee welfare benefit plan., 43 This is important because the vast
majority of Americans receive their health coverage through some sort of
employee welfare benefits plan governed by ERISA. 44 Having the majority
of Americans' health plans governed by the same federal statute, as opposed
to many different and perhaps conflicting state and local statutes, furthers
38. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47 (1987) (stating that the broad com-
mon sense meaning of the phrase "relate to" means having "a connection with or reference
to").
39. N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514
U.S. 645, 661-62 (1995).
40. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2000). Section 1144(b)(2)(A) states that "nothing in this
subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any [s]tate
which regulates insurance, banking, or securities." Id.
41. § 1 144(b)(2)(B). Section I1 44(b)(2)(B) states:
Neither an employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title, which is not exempt
under section 1003(b) of this title (other than a plan established primarily for the purpose of
providing death benefits), nor any trust established under such a plan, shall be deemed to be an
insurance company or other insurer, bank, trust company, or investment company or to be en-
gaged in the business of insurance or banking for purposes of any law of any State purporting
to regulate insurance companies, insurance contracts, banks, trust companies, or investment
companies.
Id.
42. Troy Paredes, Stop-Loss Insurance, State Regulation, and ERISA: Defining the
Scope of Federal Preemption, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 233, 234 (1997).
43. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2000). Section 1002(1) describes the term "employee
welfare benefit plan" as follows:
[A]ny plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or maintained by
an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that such plan, fund, or
program was established or is maintained for the purpose of providing for its participants or
their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or
hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death or un-
employment ....
Id.
44. Timothy S. Jost, Pegram v. Herdrich: The Supreme Court Confronts Managed Care,
1 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 187, 187 (2001) (estimating that eighty-eight percent of
Americans with private health insurance have employment-based coverage).
[Vol. 31
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Congress' goal of creating a uniform federal common law.45 Section 514
also has the effect of complete federal preemption, meaning that a defendant
may remove any related lawsuit filed in state court to federal court, even if
the plaintiff did not plead a federal law violation.46
Section 502, ERISA's "[c]ivil enforcement" 47 provision, enumerates
the exclusive remedies available in ERISA actions.48 This provision states
the following:
A civil action may be brought ... by a participant, beneficiary, or
fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any pro-
vision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain
other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or
(ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the
plan.49
The other appropriate equitable relief language, of subsection B of this
provision, has been interpreted to not include claims for punitive, consequen-
tial, or other state specific damages resulting from a breach of the benefits
plan contract.5° Limiting the available remedies and enabling defendants to
remove ERISA actions to federal court help achieve Congress' intended
goals of ensuring the solvency of employee benefit plans and encouraging
employers to provide benefits to their employees.
45. See N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
514 U.S. 645, 657 (1995).
46. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987). According to the "well-
pleaded complaint rule," a defendant may not invoke federal subject matter jurisdiction if the
plaintiff has not raised a federal law issue in the complaint. Id. However, the Court in Metro-
politan. Life Insurance. Co. established that ERISA section 514(a) completely preempts state
law claims, and according to the complete preemption doctrine, there is federal subject matter
jurisdiction over these claims. Id. at 66. "Congress has clearly manifested an intent to make
causes of action within the scope of the civil enforcement provisions of [section] 502(a) re-
movable to federal court." Id.
47. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2000).
48. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987) (stating that "ERISA's civil
enforcement remedies were intended to be exclusive").
49. § 11 32(a)(3) (emphasis added).
50. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 255 (1993) (emphasis added) (noting that
section 502(a)(3)'s provision for other appropriate equitable relief does not permit the recov-
ery of consequential damages); see also Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134,
144 (1985) (asserting that the language of ERISA does not support "a private right of action
for compensatory or punitive relief").
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B. An Insurer's Action for Reimbursement or Subrogation
Subrogation and reimbursement are related doctrines intended to pre-
vent unearned enrichment and injustice." Subrogation is the principle
whereby a fiduciary,52 who has indemnified 3 a beneficiary, is substituted for
that beneficiary in a suit against a third party for compensation of losses sus-
tained by the fiduciary, caused by that third party.54 An insurer's subroga-
tion rights often arise out of a contractual provision in an insurance policy."
Enforcement of these rights is disfavored by state judiciaries and legis-
latures, because it seems to violate the public policies against assigning per-
sonal injury claims and the prohibition against splitting causes of action.56
However, "[o]ver the past thirty years. . . insurers have continually sought"
enforcement of these provisions.5 7 To avoid violating these public policies,
the insurance industry redesigned the language of their contracts to grant
them the right of reimbursement5 8 instead of subrogation.59  The effect of
this redrafting was to "create the economic reality of subrogation ... without
51. A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 846 (2d ed. 1995).
52. A fiduciary is "[a] person who... act[s] for the benefit of another person on all mat-
ters within the scope of their relationship." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 658 (8th ed. 2004).
For the purposes of this article, the ERISA insurers are the fiduciaries acting for the benefit of
the ERISA beneficiaries.
53. To indemnify means "[t]o reimburse (another) for a loss suffered because of a third
party's or one's own act or default." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 783-84 (8th ed. 2004).
54. Roger M. Baron, Subrogation: A Pandora's Box Awaiting Closure, 41 S.D. L. REV.
237, 238 (1996) [hereinafter Baron, Subrogation]; BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1467 (8th ed.
2004).
55. Baron, Subrogation, supra note 54, at 238.
56. See, e.g., 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1720 (2006) ("In actions arising out of the main-
tenance or use of a motor vehicle, there shall be no right of subrogation or reimbursement
from a claimant's tort recovery with respect to . . . benefits paid or payable by a program,
group contract or other arrangement .... ."); Wrightsman v. Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins.
Co., 147 S.E,2d 860, 861 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966) (holding a subrogation provision "void and of
no effect" because the provision "amounted to no more than an agreement to assign a personal
injury claim"). See also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Baker, 797 P.2d 168, 172 (Kan. Ct.
App. 1990) (upholding Missouri's anti-subrogation law); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. DeJane,
326 N.E.2d 701, 705 (Ohio Ct. App. 1974) (stating that not allowing subrogation of medical
expenses follows the rule that one cannot split causes of action for the benefit of "the insured
public and the public at large").
57. Baron, Subrogation, supra note 54, at 238-39.
58. Reimbursement simply means repayment. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1312 (8th ed.
2004).
59. See, e.g., In re Estate of Scott, 567 N.E.2d 605, 607 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (holding that
"the language of the Plan's subrogation provision does not call for the full assignment of the
insured's rights but, rather, mere reimbursement of amounts forwarded by the Plan").
[Vol. 31
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its language., 6' This is a prime example of the creative lawyering that will
be discussed later in this Note.
III. KNUDSON: THE LAW ESTABLISHED
In the landmark case Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v.
Knudson,6' the United States Supreme Court established the law regarding
ERISA subrogation and reimbursement actions brought by insurers to re-
cover medical expenses paid on behalf of their beneficiaries.62 Section A of
this part presents the facts and holding of Knudson, while Section B dis-
cusses the federal circuits' conflicting interpretations of the law.
A. Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson
ERISA's text is silent as to whether it applies to a fiduciary's action for
reimbursement or subrogation. 63 However, courts have consistently applied
ERISA to such actions. 64  The United States Supreme Court decided
Knudson in 2002.65 In Knudson, an ERISA plan beneficiary was injured in a
car accident. 66 Her ERISA insurance plan contained a reimbursement provi-
sion that provided the insurer a right to recover for any expenses it had paid
on behalf of its beneficiary, from any third party settlement awarded to the
beneficiary. 67 The insurer paid $411,157.11 of the beneficiary's medical
expenses. 6' The following year, the beneficiary filed a tort action in a Cali-
fornia state court against the third party responsible for the car accident, and
60. Lee v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 129 Cal. Rptr. 271, 278 (Ct. App. 1976) (Friedman,
J., concurring).
61. 534 U.S. 204 (2002).
62. See id. at 221.
63. Member Servs. Life Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 130 F.3d 950, 958 (10th
Cir. 1997); see also Roger M. Baron, Public Policy Considerations Warranting Denial of
Reimbursement to ERISA Plans: It's Time to Recognize the Elephant in the Courtroom, 55
MERCER L. REV. 595, 617 (2004) (noting that "nothing in the ERISA scheme endorses reim-
bursement or suggests that reimbursement is permitted under ERISA") [hereinafter Baron,
Public Policy].
64. See Admin. Comm. of the Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Willard, 393 F.3d 1119, 1120-21
(10th Cir. 2004); Admin. Comm. of the Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Varco, 338 F.3d 680, 688
(7th Cir. 2003); Bombardier Aerospace Employee Welfare Benefits Plan v. Ferrer, Poirot &
Wansbrough, 354 F.3d 348, 357 (5th Cir. 2003).
65. Knudson, 534 U.S. at 204.
66. Id. at 207.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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subsequently recovered a $650,000 settlement.69 The settlement allocated
approximately $250,000 to a Special Needs Trust, pursuant to California law,
and the remaining sum was given to the beneficiary's attorney for fees and
other expenses.7" Prior to the state court's approval of the settlement, the
insurer filed an action in federal court under section 502(a)(3) to enforce the
reimbursement provision, which would require the beneficiary to pay
$411,157.11 to the insurer from the third party settlement proceeds. 71 The
district court granted summary judgment to the beneficiary on this claim,"
which was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Thereafter, the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and ultimately found that the
insurer was seeking to impose personal liability on the beneficiary for a con-
tractual obligation to pay money.74 Because "[a] claim for money due .
under a contract is 'quintessentially an action at law,"' 75 it is not recoverable
under the other equitable relief terminology of section 502(a)(3). 76  The
Court dismissed the insurer's claim that its restitution action was equitable
and clarified that 'restitution is a legal remedy when ordered in a case at
law' . . . which depends on . . . the nature of the underlying remedies
sought., 7  However, Justice Scalia also stated the following:
[A] plaintiff could seek restitution in equity, ordinarily in the form
of a constructive trust or an equitable lien, where money or prop-
erty identified as belonging in good conscience to the plaintiff
could clearly be traced to particular funds or property in the defen-
dant's possession. A court of equity could then order a defendant
to transfer title (in the case of the constructive trust) or to give a
security interest (in the case of the equitable lien) to a plaintiff who
was, in the eyes of equity, the true owner. But where "the property
[sought to be recovered] or its proceeds have been dissipated so
69. Id.
70. Knudson, 534 U.S. at 207-08. The Court also allocated $13,828.70 to the insurer for
past medical expenses but the insurer did not cash the check. Id. at 208.
71. Id. The insurer subsequently filed a complaint seeking a temporary restraining order
against continuation of the state court proceedings for approval of the settlement, which was
denied. Id.
72. Id.
73. Knudson, 534 U.S. at 209. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed on different
grounds. Id.
74. Id.at209-10.
75. Id. at 210 (quoting Admin. Comm. of the Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Wells, 213 F.3d
398, 401 (7th Cir. 2000)).
76. See id. at 221.
77. Knudson, 534 U.S. at 213 (quoting Reich v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 33 F.3d 754, 756 (7th
Cir. 1994)).
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that no product remains, [the plaintiffs] claim is only that of a
general creditor," and the plaintiff "cannot enforce a constructive
trust of or equitable lien upon other property of the [defendant]."78
B. Confusion Among the Circuits
Justice Scalia's statement that a plaintiff could possibly seek equitable
restitution by bringing an action for a constructive trust or equitable lien has
led to some confusion as to whether reimbursement and subrogation provi-
sions are enforceable under section 502(a)(3). 79 Knudson seems to answer
this question in the negative. 80 Following Knudson, the Sixth and Ninth Cir-
cuit Courts of Appeals refused to recognize insurers' claims for reimburse-
ment of medical expenses paid on behalf of their beneficiaries. 8 1 However,
the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals permitted
reimbursement and subrogation actions by insurers if certain criteria were
met. 82
The courts that outright opposed an insurer's action for reimbursement
focused on the following portion of the Knudson opinion:
78. Id. at 213-14 (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 215, cmt. a (1937))
(citations omitted).
79. Compare Cmty. Health Plan of Ohio v. Mosser, 347 F.3d 619, 624 (6th Cir. 2003),
overruled by Primax Recoveries Inc. v. Gunter, 433 F.3d 515 (6th Cir. 2006), with Admin.
Comm. of the Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Willard, 393 F.3d 1119, 1125 (10th Cir. 2004).
80. Knudson, 534 U.S. at 209, 221. The Court affirmed the judgment "that judicially
decreed reimbursement for payments made to a beneficiary of an insurance plan by a third
party is not equitable relief and is therefore not authorized by §502(a)(3) [of ERISA]." Id. at
209.
81. Qualchoice, Inc. v. Rowland, 367 F.3d 638, 649-50 (6th Cir. 2004), abrogated by
Sereboff v. Mid Atl. Med. Servs., Inc. (Sereboff III), No. 05-260, slip op. at 5, 11 (U.S. May
15, 2006) (refusing to recognize an insurer's subrogation claim and affirmed the lower court's
dismissal of it for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); Cmty. Health Plan of Ohio, 347 F.3d at
624; Westaff (USA), Inc. v. Arce, 298 F.3d 1164, 1166-67 (9th Cir. 2002), abrogated by
Sereboff III, No. 05-260, slip op. at 5 (refusing to recognize insurer's reimbursement cause of
action by affirming the lower court's dismissal of the action).
82. See Willard, 393 F.3d at 1125 (finding that insurers were entitled to restitution in the
form of an equitable lien because the criteria were satisfied); Primax Recoveries, Inc. v.
Young, No. 02-2115" slip op. at 3 (4th Cir. Dec. 18, 2003) (finding for the insurer because the
possession requirement was met), http://pacer.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinion.pdf/022115.U.pdf,
Admin. Comm. of the Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Varco, 338 F.3d 680, 688 (7th Cir. 2003)
(finding that the reimbursement action was equitable because the fund satisfied the identifi-
able requirement); see also Bombardier Aerospace Employee Welfare Benefits Plan v. Ferrer,
Poirot & Wansbrough, 354 F.3d 348, 357, 362 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding that the reimbursement
action was equitable because the possession requirement was met).
11
Sheres: Setting the Stage for Creative Lawyering in ERISA Reimbursement A
Published by NSUWorks, 2006
NOVA LA WREVIEW
Here, petitioners seek, in essence, to impose personal liability on
respondents for a contractual obligation to pay money-relief that
was not typically available in equity. "A claim for money due and
owing under a contract is 'quintessentially an action at law .... '
"Almost invariably ... suits seeking ... to compel the defendant
to pay a sum of money to the plaintiff are suits for 'money dam-
ages,' as that phrase has traditionally been applied, since they seek
no more than compensation for loss resulting from the defendant's
breach of legal duty.",
83
The courts that opposed insurer reimbursement actions based their ra-
tionale on the underlying nature of the remedies sought, as opposed to the
cause of action chosen by the plaintiff. 84 Therefore, those courts held that
even if an insurer sued based upon theories of constructive trusts or equitable
liens, its claim was essentially a legal contract claim, and thus unenforceable
under ERISA.85 Further, those courts emphasized that reimbursement claims
are unenforceable "regardless of whether the plan participant or beneficiary
recovered from another entity and possesses that recovery in an identifiable
fund.",8 6 This statement discounts the theory on which the opposing jurisdic-
tions relied.
The courts that entertained the idea of enforcing reimbursement and
subrogation provisions of ERISA plans focused more on the following lan-
guage in Knudson:
Here, the funds to which the petitioners claim an entitlement under
the Plan's reimbursement provision-the proceeds from the set-
tlement of respondents' tort action-are not in respondents' pos-
session .... The basis for the petitioners' claim is not that respon-
dents hold particular funds that, in good conscience, belong to pe-
titioners, but that petitioners are contractually entitled to some
funds for benefits that they conferred.
87
The courts that allowed reimbursement insisted that the Knudson in-
surer could not recover only because the beneficiary did not possess the set-
83. Knudson, 534 U.S. at 210 (quoting Admin. Comm. of the Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Wells, 213 F.3d 398, 401 (7th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted); Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487
U.S. 879, 918-919 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
84. See Cmty. Health Plan of Ohio, 347 F.3d at 623.
85. See Qualchoice, Inc., 367 F.3d at 649; Cmty. Health Plan of Ohio, 347 F.3d at 623.
86. Qualchoice, Inc., 367 F.3d at 650.
87. Knudson, 534 U.S. at 214 (emphasis omitted).
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tlement funds.88 Because of this lack of possession, it was determined that
the insurer's action is a legal contract claim, not an equitable claim. s9 From
this conclusion, along with Justice Scalia's previous statement regarding
constructive trusts and equitable liens, 90 arose a three-part test to determine
whether a claimant is seeking "[other] appropriate equitable relief under
[section] 502(a)(3)." 9' The three-part test, also referred to as the possession
theory,92 requires that the insurer "seek to recover funds (1) that are specifi-
cally identifiable, (2) that belong in good conscience to the [insurer], and (3)
that are within the possession and control of the defendant beneficiary." 93
IV. SEREBOFFIHI: THE LAW CLARIFIED
In 2006, the issue of ERISA reimbursement was once again in front of
the United States Supreme Court in the case of Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic
Medical Services, Inc. (Sereboff 111). 94 In Sereboff I11, the Court established
that it may be possible for an ERISA insurer to recover medical expenses
paid on a beneficiary's behalf if certain criteria are met.9 Section A of this
part presents the SereboffIII case. Section B compares the facts and holding
of Sereboff III with those of Knudson Finally, section C breaks down and
analyzes the three-part test that must be satisfied in order for an insurer to
enforce an ERISA subrogation or reimbursement provision.
88. See, e.g., Admin. Comm. of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Willard, 393 F.3d 1119, 1124
(10th Cir. 2004) (stating that in Knudson, "the Court ultimately determined that equitable
restitution was not an available remedy because the funds claimed by the fiduciary were not in
the plan beneficiary's possession"). See also Bombardier Aerospace Employee Welfare
Benefits Plan v. Ferrer, Poirot & Wansbrough, 354 F.3d 348, 356 (5th Cir. 2003); Admin.
Comm. of the Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.v. Varco, 338 F.3d 680, 687 (7th Cir. 2003).
89. See, e.g., Primax Recoveries, Inc. v. Sevilla, 324 F.3d 544, 548 (7th Cir. 2003) (con-
cluding that the action sought legal relief because the plan participant possessed only an un-
cashed check; therefore, the participant did not possess an identifiable fund); Varco, 338 F.3d
at 687-88 (concluding that the action sought equitable relief because the plan participant
possessed identifiable funds); Bauhaus USA, Inc. v. Copeland, 292 F.3d 439, 445 (5th Cir.
2002) (concluding that the action sought legal relief because, like Knudson, the settlement
funds were not in the beneficiary's possession).
90. See Knudson, 534 U.S. at 213-14.
91. Bombardier, 354 F.3d at 355 (emphasis added).
92. Wellmark, Inc. v. Deguara, 257 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1216 (S.D. Iowa 2003). "This
Court finds the possession theory is the correct read of [Knudson]." Id.
93. Bombardier, 354 F.3d at 356.
94. Sereboff v. Mid Ati. Med. Servs., Inc. (Sereboff III), No. 05-260, slip op. at 1 (U.S.
May 15, 2006).
95. See id. at 3-6.
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A. Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Services, Inc. (Sereboff III)
As a result of Knudson, the various jurisdictions treated ERISA reim-
bursement provisions differently.96 Some outright refused to enforce them,
while others applied the possession theory.97 This resulted in inconsistent
decisions which were contrary to the ERISA goal of developing a uniform
common law. 98 The United States Supreme Court attempted to clear up the
confusion on May 15, 2006, when it decided the case of SereboffIll in which
the beneficiaries of an employer-sponsored health insurance plan, covered by
ERISA, were involved in a car accident and suffered injuries. 99 The insurer
paid the beneficiaries' medical expenses, which amounted to $74 ,8 6 9.37 .1"°
The beneficiaries filed a state tort action against third parties, seeking dam-
ages for their injuries. 1 ' After the suit was commenced, the ERISA insurer
asserted a lien on the anticipated proceeds from that suit for compensation of
the medical expenses it had paid on the beneficiaries' behalf.102 Subse-
quently, the beneficiaries settled with the third parties for $750,000 which
was then distributed.'03 Because the funds had been distributed, the insurer
sought a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to require
the beneficiaries to set aside, from the settlement proceeds, an amount suffi-
cient to fully reimburse it for the medical expenses."°  The beneficiaries
agreed to set aside $74,869.37 from the proceeds in an investment account
"until the [d]istrict [c]ourt rule[d] on the merits of [the] case and all appeals,
if any, [were] exhausted."' 10 5
The district court found in favor of the insurer and ordered the benefici-
aries to pay the insurer $74,869.37 from the investment account. 106 On ap-peal, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in relevant part, and then
96. See supra notes 74-93 and accompanying text.
97. Compare Westaff (USA), Inc. v. Arce, 298 F.3d 1164, 1166-67 (9th Cir. 2002), ab-
rogated by Sereboff Iff, No. 05-260, slip op. at 11 (refusing to recognize an insurer's reim-
bursement action), with Bombardier, 354 F.3d at 356-57 (recognizing an insurer's reim-
bursement action and applying the possession theory).
98. N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514
U.S. 645, 657 (1995) (citing Senator William's statement that ERISA was intended to "elimi-
nat[e] the threat of conflicting or inconsistent [s]tate and local regulation of employee benefit
plans" 120 CoNG. REc. 29,197, 29,933 (1974)).
99. SereboffIff, No. 05-260, slip op. at 2.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. SereboffII, No. 05-260, slip op. at 2.
105. Id. at 2-3.
106. Id. at 3.
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the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.' 07 The Court found that
the insurer's action was for other appropriate equitable relief under section
502(a)(3), because the insurer sought payment by means of "constructive
trust or equitable lien on a specifically identified flud" that was in the bene-
ficiaries' possession.' 8 As such, the Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit's
judgment.' 9 This resolved the issue of whether an insurer could recover
upon a reimbursement or subrogation provision in an ERISA plan. "0 How-
ever, another question arises: Why did the United States Supreme Court
come to such a different conclusion in Sereboff III than it did in Knudson
when the facts of the cases were so similar?" This would not be an issue if
the Court had overturned or abrogated Knudson after ruling on Sereboff II,
but it did not, it merely distinguished the cases based on a fact that seems
arbitrary. "12
B. Sereboff III Compared to Knudson
The United States Supreme Court notes the similarities between the
facts of Knudson and those of SerebofflII. 13 In both cases, the beneficiaries
of ERISA plans were injured in car accidents.' " Additionally, both plans
contained reimbursement or subrogation provisions entitling the insurer to be
reimbursed from third party settlements recovered by the beneficiary." 5
Further, both insurers sought to collect for the medical expenses they had
paid on the beneficiaries' behalves.' 16 Even though these two cases arose
from almost identical facts, the Court permitted one insurer to collect and not
the other. 7
The Court explains that in Knudson, the other appropriate equitable re-
lief requirement was not met because "'the funds to which petitioners
107. Id.
108. Id. at 5.
109. Serebofflll, No. 05-260, slip op. at 11.
110. Seeid. at5.
111. Compare SereboffIII, No. 05-260, slip op. at 1, with Great-West Life & Annuity Ins.
Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002).
112. Sereboff III, No. 05-260, slip op. at 4-5 (noting the similarities between Sereboff I
and Knudson yet distinguishing the cases based on how the collateral third party settlement
checks were distributed).
113. Id. at4-5.
114. Id. at4.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Compare Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 221 (2002)
(refusing to enforce the reimbursement provision), with Sereboff ll, No. 05-260, slip op. at 11
(enforcing the reimbursement provision).
15
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claim[ed] an entitlement' were not in [the beneficiary's] possession, but had
instead been placed in a 'Special Needs Trust' under California law."
18
However, the requirement was met in Sereboff II because the funds "were
'within the possession and control of the [beneficiaries, since the funds
were]' . . . set aside and 'preserved in the [beneficiaries'] investment ac-
counts. '""'" The Court notes that this distinction is the difference between
seeking a constructive trust or equitable lien, which are equitable remedies,
and imposing personal liability on a defendant, which is legal. '20
Based on this rationale, it appears as though a beneficiary is able to
avoid enforcement of an ERISA reimbursement provision by simply allocat-
ing third party settlement funds so that the insurer could not satisfy the pos-
session theory requirements.
C. A Deeper Understanding of the Possession Theory
As indicated above, all three requirements of the possession theory must
be satisfied for an insurer to enforce a reimbursement provision.' 2 ' Subsec-
tion 1 presents the first possession theory requirement-that the funds sought
be specifically identifiable-and illustrates how this requirement is satisfied.
Subsection 2 analyzes the second requirement-that the funds belong in
good conscience to the insurer-and how this requirement is met. Subsec-
tion 3 discusses the last requirement-that a beneficiary must possess the
funds-and identifies which funds are and are not in a beneficiary's posses-
sion.
1. The Specifically Identifiable Requirement
The first requirement for an insurer to exercise its reimbursement or
subrogation rights is that the funds which the insurer seeks to assert a con-
structive trust or equitable lien on be specifically identifiable. 22 This stems
from the requirement that a constructive trust and equitable lien can only be
118. SereboffIII, No. 05-260, slip op. at 4-5.
119. Id. at 5 (quoting Mid Atil. Med. Servs., Inc. v. Sereboff (Sereboff fl), 407 F.3d 212,
218 (4th Cir. 2005)).
120. Id.
121. See Wellmark, Inc. v. Deguara, 257 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1216 (S.D. Iowa 2003); Bom-
bardier Aerospace Employee Welfare Benefits Plan v. Ferrer, Poirot & Wansbrough, 354 F.3d
348, 355 (5th Cir. 2003).
122. Bombardier, 354 F.3d at 356. The Plan must "seek to recover funds .. that are
specifically identifiable." Id.
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invoked on a specific res, 12 3 either the funds belonging to the insurer or prop-
erty that has been exchanged for those funds.'24 However, where one can
show only that another has received funds, but cannot demonstrate that those
specific funds are still in the other's possession, there is no identifiable fund
on which to assert a trust or lien.'25 As such, the only remedy available
would be a general debt that may be pursued only at law.'26 In theory, if a
beneficiary cashed a third-party settlement check and buried the money,
there would be no identifiable fund on which the insurer could seek a trust or
lien. '27 However, the check would have to have been cashed and not merely
deposited in a bank account, because a bank account is specifically identifi-
able and therefore subject to a constructive trust or equitable lien.'28 In addi-
tion to the obvious ethical restraints, cashing and hiding funds in this manner
will likely prove unsuccessful. 2 9 Before a settlement agreement is even
made and a check disbursed, it is likely that the insurer will place a lien on
the anticipated proceeds.' 30 This lien is one that a court will likely en-
force. '' Even if the insurer did not have such foresight, it may just as easily
seek a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction requiring a suf-
ficient portion of the settlement proceeds to be set aside before or after dis-
tributing the funds. 13 2 Because of these options, which the insurance compa-
nies' attorneys prudently exercise, the specifically identifiable requirement is
generally satisfied. 131
123. A res is a fund. Primax Recoveries, Inc. v. Sevilla, 324 F.3d 544, 548 (7th Cir.
2003).
124. DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 6.1(3) (2d ed. 1993).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See id
128. See id.
129. See DOBBS, supra note 124, § 4.3(2).
130. See Sereboff v. Mid At. Med. Servs., Inc. (Sereboff III), No. 05-260, slip op. at 2
(U.S. May 15, 2006) (noting that the insurer's attorney asserted a lien on the anticipated pro-
ceeds); see also Lee v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 129 Cal. Rptr. 271, 277 (Ct. App. 1976).
131. See SereboffIII, No. 05-260, slip op. at 11 (enforcing the equitable lien on the settle-
ment proceeds).
132. Id. at 2; see e.g., Bombardier Aerospace Employee Welfare Benefits Plan v. Ferrer,
Poirot & Wansbrough, 354 F.3d 348, 350 (5th Cir. 2003).
133. See SereboffIII, No. 05-260, slip op. at 5; Bombardier, 354 F.3d at 355; Bauhaus
USA, Inc. v. Copeland, 292 F.3d 439, 451 (5th Cir. 2002) (stating that the insurer was "con-
testing title to a specific and identifiable quantum of funds").
17
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2. The Belonging in Good Conscience Requirement
The second requirement an insurer must meet in order to enforce a re-
imbursement or subrogation provision is that the identifiable funds which it
seeks to assert a trust or lien on belong to the insurer in good conscience. "'
There has been little debate on this topic mainly because these suits generally
arise from a clear and unambiguous reimbursement provision of an ERISA
plan, which the employee has signed. '35 However, one might argue that the
settlement funds do not belong in good conscience to the insurer. As stated
previously, a constructive trust or an equitable lien can only be asserted on a
res that is traceable to the insurer.136 Usually, either the actual funds that
belong to the insurer or property exchanged for those funds will suffice. 137
In ERISA reimbursement actions, the funds belonging to the insurer-the
funds actually disbursed to the beneficiary pursuant to the ERISA policy-
are generally used for their intended purpose of payment for the beneficiary's
medical expenses. 38 Therefore, the only res belonging to the insurer would
be the hospital beds, medication, or services purchased with those funds. 
39
An insurer might argue that the settlement funds received are repayment
for the medical treatment provided to the beneficiary. Since the insurer has
reimbursement rights, the funds belong to it in good conscience and the in-
surer should be fully reimbursed before the beneficiary collects anything.
Generally, however, the majority of these types of settlement funds are cate-
gorized as compensation for the beneficiary's injuries and suffering, not
medical expenses. 4 ° So, perhaps the funds do not belong in good con-
science to the insurers.
Further, given that the insurers have been collecting premiums and
ERISA's purpose was to protect employees, one may argue that beneficiaries
134. Bombardier, 354 F.3d at 356. Bombardier Aerospace Employee Welfare Benefits
Plan (The Plan) must seek funds "that 'belong in good conscience' to the plan." Id.
135. See id. In several cases, the policy "terms contained an express, unambiguous reim-
bursement provision which made the disputed funds 'belong in good conscience' to the [in-
surer.]" Id. This ignores the fact that the terms of a beneficiary's ERISA plan policy are
generally negotiated by his or her employer, who may or may not be acting in the benefici-
ary's best interest. Kathy L. Cerminara, Contextualizing ADR in Managed Care: A Proposal
Aimed at Easing Tensions and Resolving Conflict, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 547, 570 (2002).
136. DOBBS, supra note 124, § 6.1(3).
137. Id. n.1.
138. See Bombardier, 354 F.3d at 350; Bauhaus USA, Inc., 292 F.3d at 440.
139. See DOBBS, supra note 124, § 6.1(3) (stating that only the property regarded as the
source of the debt or the property substituted for it can be the subject of a constructive trust).
140. See, e.g., Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 207-08
(2002). Only $13,828.70 of the $650,000 settlement was allocated to medical expenses, even
though the medical expenses actually amounted to over $400,000. Id.
[Vol. 31
18
Nova Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 7
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol31/iss1/7
2006] CREATIVE LA WYERING IN ERISA REIMBURSEMENT ACTIONS 205
should be fully or at least partially reimbursed before insurers."'4 This con-
cept is embodied in the make-whole doctrine. 142 At least three federal cir-
cuits have adopted this doctrine.'43 These circuits agree that the make-whole
doctrine is the default rule in ERISA reimbursement actions, yet not applica-
ble when the ERISA policy clearly and specifically gives the insurer "prior-
ity to the funds recovered and [the] right to any full or partial recovery."' 144
Other circuits have refused to adopt the make-whole doctrine. 45 The United
States Supreme Court did not address this particular doctrine in Sereboff III
or in Knudson.146 Further, neither decision conflicts with either side of the
circuit split. 147 Therefore, one can only speculate as to how the Court would
decide on the matter.
141. David M. Kono, Unraveling the Lining of ERISA Insurer Pockets-A Vote for Na-
tional Federal Common Law Adoption of the Make Whole Doctrine, 2000 BYU L. REv. 427,
449 (2000).
142. Moore v. Capital Care, Inc. (Moore II), Nos. 04-7121 & 7122, slip op. at 12-13 (U.S.
D.C. Cir. Aug. 29, 2006). The court defines the make-whole doctrine as:
[1]n the absence of contrary statutory law or valid contractual obligations to the contrary, the
general rule under the doctrine of equitable subrogation is that where an insured is entitled to
receive recovery for the same loss from more than one source, e.g., the insurer and the tortfea-
sor, it is only after the insured has been fully compensated for all of the loss that the insurer
acquires a right to subrogation, or is entitled to enforce its subrogation rights. The rule applies
as well to instances in which the insured has recovered from the third party and the insurer at-
tempts to exercise its subrogation right by way of reimbursement against the insured's recov-
ery.
Id. Make-whole provisions prevent insurers from being reimbursed until after the beneficiary
has been fully compensated for losses suffered. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 975 (8th ed.
2004).
143. Moore II, Nos. 04-7121 & 04-7122, slip op. at 12-13; Copeland Oaks v. Haupt, 209
F.3d 811, 813-14 (6th Cir. 2000) (requiring the beneficiary to be made whole before the in-
surer may enforce subrogation rights); Cagle v. Bruner, 112 F.3d 1510, 1521-22 (11 th Cir.
1997); Barnes v. Indep. Auto. Dealers Ass'n of Cal. Health & Welfare Benefit Plan, 64 F.3d
1389, 1394-95 (9th Cir. 1995).
144. Copeland Oaks, 209 F.3d at 813 (italics omitted).
145. See Harris v. Harvard Pilgrim Health Care, Inc., 208 F.3d 274, 280-81 (1st Cir.
2000); Waller v. Hormel Foods Corp., 120 F.3d 138, 140 (8th Cir. 1997); Sunbeam-Oster Co.
Group Benefits Plan v. Whitehurst, 102 F.3d 1368, 1377-78 (5th Cir. 1996).
146. See generally Sereboff v. Mid At. Med. Servs., Inc. (Sereboffll), No. 05-260, slip
op. (U.S. May 15, 2006); Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204
(2002).
147. See id The Knudson decision does not conflict with either side because the insurer
could not recover based solely on the beneficiary's lack of possession. Knudson, 534 U.S. at
214. The Sereboffll decision does not conflict with either side because there was clear and
specific language in the policy giving the insurer the right to fully recover from the settlement
funds. SereboffIll, No. 05-260, slip op. at 2.
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3. The Possession Requirement
The third requirement-that the beneficiary possess the funds which the
insurer is seeking a trust or lien on-has been the turning point for the major-
ity of these cases. 148 In Knudson, the insurer could not recover because the
Special Needs Trust was not in the beneficiary's possession. 49 In Sereboff
III, the insurer was able to recover because the investment account was in the
beneficiaries' possession. 5 Therefore, if a beneficiary could allocate funds
so that they were not in his or her own possession, an ERISA insurer could
not be reimbursed from those funds.
Possession is having "[t]he right under which one may exercise control
over something to the exclusion of all others."'' One may have actual or
constructive possession over property. 5 2  Actual possession is having
"[p]hysical occupancy or control over property."' 53 Constructive possession
means having "[c]ontrol or dominion over [] property without actual... cus-
tody of it."' 54 Both of these types of possession satisfy the possession re-
quirement under the possession theory. 55 The next step in establishing
whether an insurer will be able to satisfy the possession requirement is de-
termining what types of funds one does or does not possess. An analysis of
common law may aid in this determination.
a. Possessory Funds
In Sereboff-III, the Court established that placing funds in an investment
account that the beneficiary has control over satisfies the possession re-
quirement. '56 In Administrative Committee of the Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
148. Knudson, 534 U.S. at 213. The Plan must seek funds within the control and posses-
sion of the beneficiary. Id.
149. Id. at214.
150. SereboffIII, No. 05-260, slip op. at 5.
151. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1201 (8th ed. 2004).
152. Id. at 1201-02.
153. Id. at 1201.
154. Id.
155. See Admin. Comm. of the Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Varco, 338 F.3d 680, 691 (7th
Cir. 2003). Since the funds were in the beneficiary's own account he had sole possession over
them and satisfied the possession requirement. Id. See also Bombardier Aerospace Employee
Welfare Benefits Plan v. Ferrer, Poirot, & Wamsbrough, 354 F.3d 348, 356 (5th Cir. 2003).
Since the funds were being held by the beneficiary's agent, the beneficiary had ultimate con-
trol over them giving him constructive possession. Id.
156. Sereboffv. Mid Ati. Med. Servs., Inc. (Sereboff III), No. 05-260, slip op. at 5 (U.S.
May 15, 2006).
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Varco, 157 the beneficiary's attorney held the settlement funds in a reserve
account for the beneficiary which also satisfied the possession require-
ment.'58  In Administrative Committee of the Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Willard,'59 the beneficiary agreed to have the settlement funds placed in the
court registry.160 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found this agreement
to establish that the beneficiary exercised control over the funds and deemed
him to have constructive possession of the funds.161 In Bombardier Aero-
space Employee Welfare Benefits Plan v. Ferrer, Poirot, & Wamsbrough, 162
the settlement funds were being held in a bank account in the beneficiary's
attorneys' names.163 Since the attorneys were indisputably the beneficiary's
agents, the beneficiary had ultimate control over the funds which satisfied
constructive possession. These cases exemplify the courts' eagerness to en-
force reimbursement provisions, furthering Congress' ultimate goals of creat-
ing a uniform common law16' and encouraging employers to provide benefit
plans. 6
5
b. Non-possessory Funds
Despite insurers' best efforts, beneficiaries have on occasion been able
to avoid the enforcement of reimbursement provisions of ERISA plans. 1
66
One example is a Special Needs Trust. 167 In Knudson, the United States Su-
preme Court determined that if settlement funds are placed in a Special
Needs Trust, then those funds are not considered to be in the beneficiary's
possession. 68 A Special Needs Trust, also referred to as a Supplemental
Needs Trust, 169 is defined as: "A trust established to provide supplemental
income for a disabled beneficiary who is receiving or may be eligible to re-
157. 338 F.3d 680 (7th Cir. 2003).
158. Id. at 684, 688.
159. 393 F. 3d 1119 (10th Cir. 2004).
160. Id. at 1121.
161. Id. at 1125.
162. 354 F.3d 348 (5th Cir. 2003).
163. Id. at 356.
164. N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514
U.S. 645, 657 (1995); Fort Halifax Packing Co., Inc. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 11 (1987).
165. See H.R. Rep. No. 93-533, pt. I, at 4639-40.
166. See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 214 (2002).
167. Id. at 214.
168. Id.
169. Gail C. Eichstadt, Using Trusts to Provide for the Needs of an Adult Child with a
Disability: An Introduction to Family Concerns for Lawyers and a Primer on Trusts for Par-
ents, 45 S.D. L. REv. 622, 636 (2000).
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ceive government benefits."' 170 Another example is an un-cashed check.' 7'
In Primax Recoveries, Inc. v. Sevilla, 172 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
established that an un-cashed check does not give a beneficiary possession of
funds even if he has the ability to cash it.'17 A third example is funds held in
a court registry.'74 In Bauhaus USA, Inc. v. Copeland,17 1 the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals found that funds placed in the Mississippi Chancery
Court's registry were also not in the beneficiary's possession, contrary to the
finding in Willard. 76 These examples illustrate possible scenarios in which
beneficiaries may avoid the possession requirement.
V. THE LIKELY EFFECT OF SEREBOFF III AND THE PossEssIoN THEORY ON
FUTURE REIMBURSEMENT AND SUBROGATION CLAIMS BY INSURERS
"[An attorney's] task is to convert the requirements of the client into le-
gal solutions . . . "' "The combination of specific rules and an emphasis on
legal form and literalism can be used artificially, in a manipulative way to
circumvent or undermine the purpose of regulation," in order to serve a cli-
ent's needs. 17  Now that it has been established by the United States Su-
preme Court in Knudson and Sereboff II, that the standard for reimburse-
ment actions in ERISA cases is the possession theory, attorneys on both sides
will likely shape their legal solutions to conform to this standard.
Section A of this part will analyze how a beneficiary's attorney may try
to avoid enforcement of a subrogation or reimbursement provision of an
ERISA plan through the application or manipulation of case law and the law
of trusts. This section will also present the legal and ethical restraints on an
attorney's success. Section B identifies the steps an insurer's attorney must
take in order to satisfy the possession theory requirements and enforce a sub-
rogation or reimbursement provision.
170. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1552 (8th ed. 2004).
171. See Primax Recoveries, Inc. v. Sevilla, 324 F.3d 544, 546 (7th Cir. 2003).
172. Id. at 544.
173. Id. at 548.
174. See Bauhaus USA, Inc. v. Copeland, 292 F.3d 439, 441 (5th Cir. 2002).
175. Id. at 439.
176. Id. at 445; see Admin. Comm. of the Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Willard, 393 F.3d
1119, 1124-25 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that the beneficiary had constructive possession of
the funds placed in the court registry satisfied the possession requirement).
177. Joseph McCahery & Sol Picciotto, Creative Lawyering and the Dynamics of Business
Regulation 240, in YVES DEZELAY & DAVID SUGARMAN, PROFESSIONAL COMPETITION AND
PROFESSIONAL POWER: LAWYERS, ACCOUNTANTS, AND THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
MARKETS (1995).
178. Doreen McBarnet & Christopher Whelan, The Elusive Spirit of the Law: Formalism
and the Struggle for Legal Control, 54 MOD. L. REV. 848, 849 (1991).
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A. Lawyering on the Part of Beneficiaries
Despite the insurer's success in Sereboff III, the United States Supreme
Court's ruling in Knudson and the appellate courts' rulings in Sevilla and
Bauhaus USA, Inc. still remain good law." 9 In all three of these cases, the
beneficiaries were successful, because the insurers were unable to meet all
the requirements of the possession theory.'80 The success of these benefici-
aries may give future beneficiaries and their attorneys hope that they too can
succeed in avoiding the enforcement of ERISA reimbursement provisions.
For instance, an attorney may attempt to have a beneficiary's third party set-
tlement proceeds placed in a Special Needs Trust since this act enabled the
Knudson beneficiary to succeed.' 8' However, this may not be as easy or
successful as one might think, since not every injured beneficiary is eligible
for a Special Needs Trust. 8 2  Further, even if a beneficiary is eligible and
successful in placing those funds in the Special Needs Trust, there is no
guarantee that the funds will be unattainable by the insurer. 
83
When the law does not support a client's case and an attorney is under
pressure to find a legal solution to the client's problem, that attorney may be
enticed to manipulate or circumvent the law, so that it appears to favor a par-
ticular client's case.' 84 For example, combining the ruling in Sevilla 85 with
the specifically identifiable res requirement of the possession theory'86 pre-
179. See Sereboff v. Mid At. Med. Servs., Inc. (Sereboff III), No. 05-260, slip op. at 11
(U.S. May 15, 2006); Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 204
(2002); Primax Recoveries, Inc. v. Sevilla, 324 F.3d 544, 548 (7th Cir. 2003); Bauhaus USA,
Inc., 292 F.3d at 445.
180. See Knudson, 534 U.S. at 214; Sevilla, 324 F.3d at 548 (7th Cir. 2003); Bauhaus
USA, Inc., 292 F.3d at 445.
181. Knudson, 534 U.S. at 214.
182. See Eichstadt, supra note 169, at 636 (indicating that a Special Needs Trust must
meet the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(a)(4)(A) (2000)). The requirements include:
A trust containing the assets of an individual under age 65 who is disabled... and which is es-
tablished for the benefit of such individual by a parent, grandparent, legal guardian of the indi-
vidual, or a court if the State will receive all amounts remaining in the trust upon the death of
such individual up to an amount equal to the total medical assistance paid on behalf of the in-
dividual under a State plan under this subchapter.
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(A) (2000).
183. See Knudson, 534 U.S. at 220. The court stated that it did not decide on whether the
insurer could have sought equitable relief from the beneficiary's attorney or the trustee of the
Special Needs Trust. Id.
184. Bruce D. Black, The Use (or Abuse) of Expert Witnesses in Post-Daubert Employ-
ment Litigation, 17 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 269, 284 n.86 (2000) (quoting MERIT BENNETT,
LAW & THE HEART 25 (1997)).
185. Sevilla, 324 F.3d at 548.
186. Bombardier Aerospace Employee Welfare Benefits Plan v. Ferrer, Poirot, & Wams-
brough, 354 F.3d 348, 356 (5th Cir. 2003).
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sents a possible loophole. Since the un-cashed check in Sevilla was not sub-
ject to equitable remedies,187 and cashing a check makes funds not specifi-
cally identifiable, 188 an inexperienced attorney may instruct his client to hold
onto the un-cashed check until after the insurer's suit is dismissed, then cash
it quickly, and hide the funds. Although at first glance this solution seems
feasible, such unscrupulous legal advice would likely subject an attorney to
professional sanctions, a malpractice suit, and possibly criminal charges.'89
Further, it will also likely prove unsuccessful for a couple of reasons. First,
the facts surrounding the Sevilla case were unique, since the beneficiary's
purpose for not cashing the check was to prevent another case from becom-
ing moot, not to avoid an obligation. 90 Second, a court may issue a prelimi-
nary injunction or temporary restraining order preventing the beneficiary
from cashing the check.'91
An attorney may also attempt to avoid the possession requirement by
having settlement proceeds placed in a court registry.'92 However, this will
also likely fail its intended purpose. '9' In Bauhaus USA, Inc., the beneficiary
was successful only because the funds were placed in the registry in anticipa-
tion of an interpleader action' 94 that never developed, not in an attempt to
evade a reimbursement provision. 95 Because these solutions will likely fail,
a beneficiary's attorney may look to the law of trusts for further assistance.
1. Basic Trusts
A trust arises when one person holds title to property "subject to an eq-
uitable obligation to keep or use the property for the benefit of another."''
96
A trust may be created inter vivos' 97 or by testament. 198 A trust may ex-
187. See Sevilla, 324 F.3d at 549-50.
188. See Bombardier, 354 F.3d at 356.
189. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY & CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT DR 7-102(A)(7)
(1980); 16 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D Legal Malpractice-Inadequate Case Investigation §
2 (1978).
190. Sevilla, 324 F.3d at 548 (noting the reason the check was not cashed was to avoid
mooting a collateral case).
191. DOBBS, supra note 124, § 2.11(1).
192. See, e.g., Bauhaus USA, Inc. v. Copeland, 292 F.3d 439, 445 (5th Cir. 2002).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 441. In an interpleader action, property is held by an uninterested third party
until the ownership rights of that property are determined. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 837
(8th ed. 2004).
195. Bauhaus USA, Inc., 292 F.3d at 441.
196. GEORGE T. BOGERT, TRUSTS § 1 (6th ed. 1987).
197. 1 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT ET AL., SCOTr AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS § 3.1 (5th ed.
2006). A trust created inter vivos is created during one's lifetime. Id
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pressed or implied. 199 Express trusts are those created through a written
document20 0 called a trust instrument, which details the powers, rights, du-
ties, and terms of the trust.2 0 1 Implied trusts are those created by courts be-
cause the facts of a particular case warrant their creation.20 2 Furthermore,
trusts can be either revocable or irrevocable, depending on the terms of the
trust. 
203
"[V]irtually all trust law is default law."' 20 4 This means that a settlor 20 5
can make any provisions, with respect to the trust, which the trustee 20 6 must
implement, as long as the provisions do not offend important rules and poli-
cies of the law of trusts.20 7
2. The Possession Requirement
Due to a settlor's ability to design the terms of the trust to his or her lik-
ing, the ERISA beneficiary may be able to set up an inter vivos express trust
in such a way as to avoid the possession requirement.2 8 One possibility is
the creation of a trust that mirrors a Special Needs Trust, except without the
eligibility requirements.20 9 This type of trust is a possible solution, since
placing funds in a Special Needs Trust enabled the beneficiary in Knudson to
avoid an ERISA reimbursement provision.210
Another possibility includes the creation of an Offshore Purpose Trust
for the settlement proceeds. 211 For example, a settlor may create this type of
198. A trust created by testament is created upon one's death. Id.
199. BOGERT, supra note 196, § 8.
200. Id.
201. Id. § 1.
202. Id. § 8.
203. 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 63 (2003).
204. John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625,
650 (1995).
205. A settlor is a person who creates a trust. BOGERT, supra note 196, § 1.
206. The trustee is the person who holds the title of the trust property, in trust, for the
beneficiary of the trust. Id.
207. 1 SCOTT ET AL., supra note 197, § 2.2.4; UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(b)(3) (2000)
(amended 2003).
208. See, e.g., Holdeen v. Ratterree, 270 F.2d 701, 706 (2d Cir. 1959) (finding that due to
the "complete absence of control in the instrument itself... the settlor did not possess such
control as to be considered substantially the owner of [the trust] property"). See I SCOTT, ET
AL.,supra note 197, § 2.2.4, 3.1.
209. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(A) (2000) (requiring for eligibility that the beneficiary
of the funds be under the age of 65 and disabled).
210. See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 214 (2002).
211. 2 ASSET PROTECTION STRATEGIES: WEALTH PRESERVATION PLANNING WITH
DOMESTIC AND OFFSHORE ENTITIES 281-83 (Alexander A. Bove, Jr. ed., 2005) [hereinafter
25
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trust to finance a child's education or to take care of a pet.21 If the settlor
would likely have paid for these expenses, then he or she would essentially
be receiving the benefits of the trust. 213 Before sending money overseas, a
settlor should first consult with a knowledgeable attorney and consider
whether such activity is financially worthwhile. Additional considerations
include: "[T]he purpose and term of the trust;" the laws and political stabil-
ity of the foreign jurisdiction; and the settlor's travel preferences.2"4
A third possibility includes placing the settlement funds in an irrevoca-
ble trust created for the benefit of the settlor's family members. 2 5 Because
an irrevocable trust is not within the control of the settlor, the possession
requirement cannot be met.2" 6 As such, it may be possible for the settlor's
family members to enjoy the benefits of the settlement funds, something the
settlor would likely prefer over having the insurance company receive the
funds.
In all of these cases, the funds would not be in the ERISA beneficiary's
possession. 2  Therefore, the insurer would be unable to satisfy this require-
ment of the possession theory. As a result, an ERISA beneficiary's attorney
might encourage the creation of one of these trusts.
3. Restrictions on the Use of Trusts
Even if an ERISA beneficiary is able to create one of these trusts and
have the third party agree to allocate the settlement funds to the trust, a court
may still have to approve the settlement.18 Courts addressing related issues
have concluded that "[a]n ERISA plan participant [cannot] unilaterally allo-
cate settlement proceeds to something other than medical expenses in order
ASSET PROTECTION STRATEGIES]. "[A] purpose trust is a trust established for a purpose rather
than for specified beneficiaries." Id. at 277. Although only a few states permit these trusts,
they may be easily formed offshore and "should be honored by U.S. courts." Id. at 281.
212. See id. at 280.
213. See id. at 279.
214. ASSET PROTECTION STRATEGIES, supra note 211, at 285.
215. James T. Lorenzetti, The Offshore Trust: A Contemporary Asset Protection Scheme,
102 CoM. L.J. 138, 150 (1997). "By making the trust irrevocable, the settlor relinquishes
control over the funds." Id.
216. Id.
217. 3 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 76 (2006). See also 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRUSTS § 175 (1959). "The trustee is under a duty... to take and keep control of the trust
property." Id.
218. See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 207-08 (2002).
The settlement money was only disbursed after the court approved the settlement and allo-
cated the funds to the Special Needs Trust. Id. at 208.
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to evade subrogation.,, 2' 9 Additionally, in Knudson, the settlement proceeds
were placed in a Special Needs Trust pursuant to California Law, not by the
parties' discretion. 2 0 Thus, if the state in which the action arises does not
require settlement funds to be placed in a Special Needs Trust, it may be
even more difficult for a beneficiary to utilize this reimbursement evasion
tactic.
Other restrictions may prevent a beneficiary from utilizing trusts to
avoid reimbursement or subrogation, such as the requirement "that the trust
have a purpose that is lawful [and] not contrary to public policy. '22' If a
court determines that the settlor created a trust for an illegal or contrary to
public policy purpose, the trust will fail.2 2 Further, "[a]n intended trust or a
particular provision in the terms of the trust [instrument] may fail for illegal-
ity where ... the purpose of the settlor in creating the trust is to defraud
creditors or other third persons. "223 Although, the settlor will likely attempt
to convince a court that the purpose of the trust was not to defraud the in-
surer, but rather to ensure the education of a child or the well-being of his or
her family or pet, it will be an uphill battle.
Regardless of whether the beneficiary is successful in creating one of
these trusts, encouraging such activity may subject the attorney to sanc-
tions. 224 The Model Code of Professional Responsibility states that an attor-
ney "shall not ... counsel or assist his client in conduct that the [attorney]
knows to be illegal or fraudulent.
2 25
B. Lawyering on the Part of Insurers
As a result of Sereboff II, insurers now have United States Supreme
Court precedent in support of their actions to enforce ERISA reimbursement
219. Moore v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of the Nat'l Capital Area (Moore 1), 70 F. Supp.
2d 9, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1999). The beneficiary claimed entitlement to all of the settlement pro-
ceeds because she had not yet been made whole for her injuries. Id. at 38. See Chitkin v.
Lincoln Nat'l Ins. Co., 879 F. Supp. 841, 862 (S.D. Cal. 1995) (finding that the reimburse-
ment provision permitted repayment from any settlement funds---except from strict liability-
regardless of how the settlement funds were allocated).
220. Knudson, 534 U.S. at 207-08.
221. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(a)(3) (2000) (amended 2003).
222. 2 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT ET AL., SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS, § 9.6 (5th ed.
2006).
223. 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 60 (1959); see also 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TRUSTS § 29 (2003).
224. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY & CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT DR 7-
102(A)(7) (1980).
225. Id.
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226provisions. 6 This will likely add to the increasing trend towards insurers
seeking enforcement of such provisions.227 Although less creativity is re-
quired on the part of the insurers' attorneys than those of beneficiaries, they
must still follow the proper procedures in order to be successful. First, the
insurers must make sure that the reimbursement provision in the ERISA plan
is signed by and enforceable against the beneficiary.228 This will likely sat-
isfy the belonging in good conscience requirement of the possession the-
ory.229 Second, the insurers' attorneys must act promptly in anticipation of,
or as a result of, the beneficiary receiving a third party settlement by seeking
a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. 23' These orders
should require the beneficiary to set aside sufficient funds from the settle-
ment proceeds to fully reimburse the insurer.231 However, it is important that
the funds be set aside in an account that is subject to a constructive trust or
equitable lien, such as the beneficiary's investment account, a court registry,
or the beneficiary's attorney's bank account, so that the possession require-
ment is met.232 With these three possession theory requirements satisfied,
the insurers have a good chance at success.233
VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Sereboff II insurer's success confirmed that pursuant to the civil
enforcement provision, section 502(a)(3) of ERISA, an insurer may succeed
in a reimbursement or subrogation action against a beneficiary for medical
expenses paid on the beneficiary's behalf.234 The United States Supreme
Court also clearly identified the requirements for enforcement of such provi-
226. Sereboff v. Mid At. Med. Servs., Inc. (Sereboff III), No. 05-260, slip op. at 11 (U.S.
May 15, 2006).
227. Baron, Subrogation, supra note 54, at 238-39.
228. See Bombardier Aerospace Employee Welfare Benefits Plan v. Ferrer, Poirot &
Wansbrough, 345 F.3d 348, 356 (5th Cir. 2003) (noting that the belonging in good conscience
requirement is satisfied when the beneficiary has signed an "express, unambiguous reim-
bursement provision").
229. See id.
230. See e.g., Sereboff III, No. 05-260, slip op. at 2. The insurer's attorney sought a pre-
liminary injunction and temporary restraining order to require the beneficiary to set aside
sufficient funds to reimburse it. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 5. See also Admin. Comm. of the Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Willard, 393 F.3d
1119, 1124-25 (10th Cir. 2004); see Admin. Comm. of the Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Varco,
338 F.3d 680, 691 (7th Cir. 2003).
233. Sereboff III, No. 05-260, slip op. at 4-5 (indicating that if these three requirements
are met, then the insurer will succeed).
234. Id. at 11.
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sions. 235 However, because there are cases which indicate that a beneficiary
may still be able to avoid reimbursing the insurer, Congress' goal of estab-
lishing a uniform common law may still be frustrated.23 6 Since a benefici-
ary's attorneys may seek to exploit possible loopholes in the possession the-
ory, there is the potential for ethical and professional conduct violations.2 37
Because of the increasing trend towards insurers seeking enforcement of
reimbursement provisions, 38 and the fact that the majority of Americans are
insured under ERISA,239 a more efficient solution than the three-pronged
analysis is necessary.
The clearest solution to this problem is to amend ERISA, specifically
indicating whether or not Congress intended for ERISA reimbursement pro-
visions to be enforceable.24 ° If the answer is "yes," the solution may be as
simple as adding the word "legal" to section 502(a)(3) of ERISA, which
would enable insurers to enforce reimbursement provisions on contract theo-
ries. If the answer is "sometimes," which is more probable, perhaps a de-
tailed outline of the situations in which enforcement is appropriate should be
provided. If Congress is concerned that explicitly requiring the enforcement
of these provisions will pose an undue burden on beneficiaries, it should in-
clude a make-whole doctrine provision in its revision of the statute. This
provision would provide that an insurer may only be reimbursed after the
beneficiary has been fully compensated for losses suffered.24 ' This would
require the tortfeasor to fulfill his or her obligation to the injured party to his
or her ability.242 It will also require the insurer to pay for the expenses cov-
ered by the premium which it has already received. 43 Until this is done,
courts will continue to exercise their discretion and attorneys on both sides
will continue to exercise their own.
235. Id. at 4-5.
236. Compare Sereboff III, No. 05-260, slip op. at 5 (refusing to reimburse the insurer),
with Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 221 (2002) (requiring
reimbursement of the insurer).
237. See supra notes 185-200 and accompanying text.
238. Baron, Subrogation, supra note 54, at 238-39.
239. Jost, supra note 44, at 187.
240. This solution is based on the fact that ERISA is silent on the issue of reimbursement
and subrogation. Member Servs. Life Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 130 F.3d 950,
958 (10th Cir. 1997); see also Baron, Public Policy, supra note 63, at 617.
241. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY at 975 (8th ed. 2004).
242. Kono, supra note 141, at 449.
243. Id.
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